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The increasing use of DNA evidence has revolu-tionized criminal investigations. Over the past several years, DNA forensics—once thought to 
be a less reliable identifier than other forensic techniques, 
such as latent fingerprinting—have now become the evi-
dentiary gold standard in criminal prosecutions. At the 
same time, non-DNA-based forensic techniques that 
have incarcerated thousands are coming under fire. 
The policy implications of this shifting dynamic—
what Michael Lynch and colleagues call an “inversion of 
credibility”1—can be most clearly seen in the National 
Research Council’s 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward. Conducted 
at Congress’s request by a highly esteemed committee, 
this report—over three hundred pages—assesses the cur-
rent state of forensic science. 
The committee found remarkable shortcomings 
in what they call the forensic science knowledge base, 
noting that the scientific theories and methods used 
to substantiate many forensic claims frequently can-
not withstand close scrutiny. They found an alarm-
ingly “wide variability in capacity, oversight, staffing, 
certification, and accreditation.”2 For example, lack of 
transparency, susceptibility to bias, and questionable 
methodologies for friction ridge analyses (analyses of the 
prints left by fingers, palms, or soles) make it difficult 
for two analysts to come to the same conclusion.3 The 
report’s sobering message is that many forensic applica-
tions simply lack scientific rigor despite their routine use 
in legal proceedings. 
Although the committee acknowledges that DNA 
forensics are not always perfect, the report and its rec-
ommendations are framed by an implied yet powerful 
claim: non-DNA forensic techniques should live up to 
the gold standard created by DNA typing. But this fram-
ing has its own serious drawbacks that obscure much 
deeper issues concerning both technical matters related 
to the scientific validity of extending basic DNA identi-
fication techniques to novel applications and the ethical, 
legal, and social implications of DNA forensics’ expand-
ing uses.
???????????????????
The NRC report is replete with both general and specific declarations that frame the accuracy and 
reliability of DNA typing as the new standard for fo-
rensic investigations. At the broad end of the spectrum, 
the committee notes “DNA typing is now universally 
recognized as the standard against which many other 
forensic individualization techniques are judged.”4 This 
sentiment also shapes the analysis of specific techniques. 
For example, they note that “overall, the process for tool-
mark and firearms comparison lacks the specificity of the 
protocols for, say, 13 STR [short tandem repeat] DNA 
analysis.”5 
Few seriously doubt DNA typing’s high reliability in 
determining whether any two isolated samples match. 
Yet DNA typing is only one of many ways in which DNA 
analyses are used in forensic investigations. For over two 
decades, state and federal governments have been col-
lecting convicted felons’ genetic profiles and depositing 
them into databases in order to be able to identify repeat 
offenders who leave biological samples at crime scenes. 
DNA databases give rise to techniques beyond mere 
DNA typing that expand criminal investigations’ scope 
???????????? ?????????????? ?
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and impact. This repository’s growth—the federal database 
itself is almost at eight million profiles6—has given rise to 
three related techniques: cold hits, partial matches, and fa-
milial searches. 
“Cold hits” occur when investigators are able to match 
unknown biological materials left at a crime scene with a 
known database profile. Partial matches occur when investi-
gators identify a suspect using fewer than thirteen loci—the 
standard number of chromosome sites where, if identical, 
a “match” between two profiles can be declared. Familial 
searches work from the premise that relatives share many 
identical loci. While the number of shared markers between 
an unknown suspect and a 
database hit might not in-
criminate the person with the 
known profile, it can and has 
pointed to a relative, who is 
then the subject of a criminal 
investigation.
Many assume that these 
database-oriented techniques 
have the same precision as 
typing two individual sam-
ples. But what often gets ob-
scured—as it does in the NRC 
report—is that these newer 
uses of DNA forensics share 
many of the same shortcom-
ings that the NRC identi-





DNA databases gain much of their authority from the oft-repeated claim that the chance that two profiles will 
randomly match—even partially—is only one in several mil-
lion. It has been argued that a nine-locus match can uniquely 
identify perpetrators,7 and individuals have been convicted 
on such partial-match evidence.
However, increasing evidence suggests that the way sci-
entists have calculated the probability for random matches 
may not be accurate. Data obtained from the Arizona state 
DNA database showed that out of 65,493 profiles, 122 pairs 
matched at nine loci, twenty pairs matched at ten, and two 
pairs (siblings) matched at eleven and twelve loci.8 Findings 
from the Illinois state database yielded similar results: 903 
pairs matched at nine or more loci out of a total of more than 
200,000 profiles. Data from the Maryland database, with 
30,000 profiles, was also surprising: thirty-two pairs matched 
at nine loci, and three matched at all thirteen.9
How could so many profiles randomly match at so many 
loci? No one knows for sure, which is why scientists and legal 
scholars are calling for more access to research government 
databases.10 The FBI and several states have thus far refused 
to comply. 
??????????????????????
The NRC report is particularly concerned with forensic science’s lack of standardization; the field has few estab-
lished protocols on how to accurately describe the signifi-
cance of such evidence. While this a demonstrable problem 
with non-DNA forensics, it is also true for DNA evidence 
related to database searches. 
For example, with “cold-hit” evidence, where investi-
gators run an unknown 
sample against thousands of 
database profiles in search of 
a “hit,” any match is only as 
significant as the statistical 
probability that it might be 
coincidental. Yet there is no 
agreed-upon standard, much 
less a gold standard, for how 
to calculate this statistic or 
how to present this evidence 
in court. 
The seemingly compelling 
one-in-a-million statistic that 
we often hear associated with 
cold-hit matches uses a popu-
lation figure as a referent—the 
likelihood that an unknown 
profile matches a suspect 
(identified for other reasons) 
purely by coincidence. How-
ever, cold-hit matches that 
occur within databases have a substantially higher probability 
of being coincidental; when searching through large databases 
with millions of profiles (like the federal database), there are 
millions of chances for coincidental matches.11 Transposing 
the statistical significance of the former approach to the latter 
is what is often referred to as the prosecutor’s fallacy and has 
been known to impact determinations of individuals’ guilt or 
innocence.12
The substantially diminished probabilities stemming 
from cold-hit database searches that take database size into 
account more accurately reflect the statistical limitations of 
this approach. This has led an NRC committee13 and an FBI 
advisory board14 to recommend making these database limi-
tations part of the calculation. Yet neither recommendation 
has been widely implemented by authorities. While the com-
mittee briefly points to these prior recommendations, they 
do not fully discuss how the absence of consistently enforced 
standards, procedures, or oversight can lead courts to receive 
misleading information that can undermine DNA forensics’ 
credibility as much as a failure to standardize non-DNA fo-
rensics affects its integrity. 
Many assume that these  
database-oriented techniques 
are as precise as typing two 
individual samples. But they 
share many shortcomings 




While DNA typing itself is far from infallible, data-base-oriented DNA forensics raise a profound series 
of second-order questions for entire groups, in contrast to 
the NRC report’s singular focus on individuals. Much of 
this stems from the unique ways in which the criminal jus-
tice system interacts with blacks and Latinos, particularly 
through policies regarding DNA databases. For example, the 
overpolicing of minority communities, along with related 
injustices, has led to these groups’ dramatic overrepresenta-
tion in prisons; 30 percent of black males will be convicted 
of a felony at least once compared to 5 percent of whites, and 
an adult black male is eight times more likely to be incarcer-
ated.15 Aggressive public policies encouraging sample collec-
tions for almost any contact with law enforcement is leading 
to an alarming statistic: although blacks represent only 13 
percent of the population, they make up an estimated 40 
percent of federal DNA database profiles.16
Given the disparate composition of DNA databases, 
techniques like familial searching raise significant questions 
regarding systemic bias. Leveraging the shared genetic vari-
ants and short tandem repeat lengths between relatives to 
find suspects will have a much larger impact on blacks and 
Latinos. What does it mean for government to turn people 
with existing stored profiles into “genetic informants” on 
their relatives without their knowledge or consent and with 
few safeguards to prevent wrongful convictions from errant 
cold hits? What are the ethical, political, and legal implica-
tions of placing a population under a lifetime of genetic sur-
veillance in which each DNA fragment shared with a banked 
relative is screened against future crime scene evidence? And 
is it just for these significant civil liberties concerns to dispro-
portionately fall upon groups already unfairly burdened by 
injustices linked to what we know to be selective patterns of 
law enforcement?17
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In addition to these concerns, several other technical issues and questionable practices with unresolved social and ethi-
cal implications also plague DNA forensics. On the techni-
cal side, contaminated samples can lead to false positives and 
false negatives, clerical errors can lead to incorrectly logged 
samples and poor data entry, and crime labs can misinter-
pret old, small, or mixed samples from multiple individuals. 
These and other technical issues are linked to broader social 
and ethical issues, such as varying practices regarding the 
destruction of samples after law enforcement has analyzed 
them, the propriety of using forensic samples for nonforen-
sic purposes like research, the ethics of surreptitious sample 
acquisition by police, and a host of other privacy issues con-
nected to the general idea of the government storing sensi-
tive genetic information indefinitely. 
Public policy regarding the use and expansion of DNA 
forensics is evolving as quickly as the technologies them-
selves. For example, a California law that went into effect 
in 2009 allows authorities to take and retain DNA samples 
from individuals merely arrested—not charged or convict-
ed—for felonies.18 And New York enacted a law in late 2009 
allowing authorities to use DNA database partial matches to 
identify suspects.19 This highlights a current trend, whereby 
law is being used to radically expand DNA databases to in-
clude larger, unsuspecting portions of the population. 
The NRC report and its recommendations represent an 
important first step to putting the scientific method’s rigor 
into forensics so that justice can prevail. If we are to take the 
report as seriously as it deserves, then the critiques it raises 
for non-DNA forensic applications must also be applied to 
the growing spectrum of DNA forensics. Like our prior un-
critical acceptance of latent fingerprint technology, the new 
proverbial gold standard might, on closer inspection, have 
far more tarnish then we have been led to believe. 
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Performing surgery in the developing world presents unique challenges and dilemmas for the visiting phy-sician from an industrialized country. Language barri-
ers, widespread, profound pathology, and lack of adequate 
facilities are obvious hurdles. A more subtle problem, though 
every bit as significant, is that the principles and procedures 
we routinely utilize at home to uphold ethical standards of 
care and to aid us in decision-making are often poorly appli-
cable in the developing world. Acknowledging that cultural 
factors play a primary role in every aspect of their interaction 
with patients, physicians must scrutinize and even modify the 
tools they employ when attempting to deliver ethical care in 
foreign environments.
Over the past two decades, I have routinely taken time 
from clinical practice to teach, practice, and perform eye sur-
gery in remote locations. I’ve enjoyed the privilege of vastly 
broadening both my professional skills and global perspec-
tive while working with some of the most devoted and self-
less health care workers I’ve encountered in my career. From 
Mongolia to points along the ancient Silk Route, to the deep 
Himalayas, to Southeast Asia, to sub-Saharan Africa, many 
of the locations where I’ve worked lack basic facilities includ-
ing potable water, reliable electricity, and proper sanitation. 
Nearly all lack what an ophthalmologist considers requisite 
for even the most basic intraocular surgery: adequate illumi-
nation and magnification. If available at all, the precise in-
strumentation necessary to manipulate tissue within the eye 
is usually worn or broken due to overuse and repeated repair. 
Cutting instruments are blunt; forcep tips no longer meet. 
Disposable equipment acquired through donation is meticu-
lously cleaned and reused far beyond its intended lifespan, 
and medications are routinely expired or implicitly under-
stood to be the “best available.” Surgical gloves and sutures 
are resterilized and used as long as possible. Dressings are in-
geniously fashioned from material of every imaginable sort. 
Indeed, resourcefulness and ingenuity are the unique and 
necessary attributes of doctors and their staff throughout the 
developing world.
I am always presented with highly advanced pathology 
when working abroad, due in part to a chronic shortage of 
trained medical personnel and resources. Whether their ail-
ments are secondary to trauma or to neglected or indolent 
disease, indigent patients usually seek care only when there is 
no alternative. The numbers are shocking: According to the 
most recent World Health Organization estimates, approxi-
mately 87 percent of the 314 million visually impaired live 
in developing countries; roughly 45 million are completely 
blind.1 About 85 percent of all visual impairment and 75 per-
cent of blindness could be prevented or cured.2 While proce-
dures performed to save or restore sight do not directly save 
lives, they are nevertheless crucial to survival in subsistence-
level societies. A blind person often represents an untenable 
responsibility for both the family and the community. It is 
believed that 60 percent to 80 percent of children who be-
come blind in the developing world die within two years.3 
A Nepalese proverb conveys the economic reality most con-
cisely: “A blind person has a mouth but no hands.”
In all of medicine, there is a unique burden associated with 
the decision to perform surgery. This arises, I suspect, from 
the very nature of an operation’s invasiveness, and is com-
pounded by the unpredictable perils of intraoperative and 
postoperative complications. In the industrialized world, a 
surgeon’s decision to operate is not only strongly supported 
by well-defined ethical principles, but also facilitated by proce-
dural tools that help to ensure the maintenance of these prin-
ciples in daily practice. The most well-known is perhaps the 
Hippocratic edict to do no harm. Every graduating medical 
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